Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance: Search, Leisure and Capital Market Imperfections by J. S. Flemming
NBER Working Paper Series
ASPECTSOF OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE:




CENTER FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
204 Junipero Serra Boulevard, Stanford, CA 94305
November 1977
Preliminary; not for quotation.
BER working papers are distributed informally and in limited
number for conents only.They should not be quoted without
written permission of the author.
This report has not undergone the review accorded official
NBER publications; in particular, it has not yet been submitted
for approval by the Board of Directors.
This research was supported by a contract with NBER from the
Office of Income Security Policy, Department of Health,Education,
and Welfare (No. HEW—100—76—O170). The author is grateful to
Martin Baily, Margaret Bray, Martin Feldsteln, MichaelHamer,
Giuseppe Mazzarino, Jim Mirrlees and Anthony Pellechio,variously
for general discussion, for help with the stochasticprocesses,
and for computing.ASPECTS OF OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: SEARCH,
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I
Unemployment Insurance (UI) can be seen as redistributive with a
trade—off between equality and efficient 'search' to be set beside
the existing 'effort' and 'education' models of optimal taxation
(e.g., Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson (1973)). The redistributive role of
UI is accentuated by capital market imperfections which tend to make
consumption vary more closely with current income.
In this paper UI will be assumed to take the form of a propor-
tional pay—roll tax used to pay a subsidy to all the unemployed.1
However the analysis here, and elsewhere, raises a number of questions
aoout this form of UI. The loss of a given amount of income will
involve a larger utility loss (given a perfect capital market) for an
older man who has fewer years over which to make the adjustment. Should
he be given higher benefits? Shavell and Weiss (1977) argue that if
benefits decline over time their disincentive effect is reduced; however
Flemming (1977, b) has shown that if there is a progressive income tax
on annual income, there is an efficiency argument for benefits increas-
ing with duration. The incentive effects of UI depend on the mix of
benefits in the traditional form of periodic payments conditional on
continued unemployment, redundancy payments (either lump sums or
unconditional payments fr a set number of periods) (Hamerniesh (1977))
and loans (the natural response to an imperfect capital market).
Finally, as Baily (1977) mentions, subsidising search activities by the
unemployed is another element in the potential policy mix.
Baily (1977) presents a two period model of the redistributive
(insurance) argument for UI which involves a curious mixture of perfect
and imperfect capital market assumptions. On the one hand, theunemployed can apparently not borrow at all against future earnings
(i.e. earnings beyond the second period); on the other hand, the second
period is not homogeneous and borrowing from the second (employed)
section of it to finance consumption during unemployment is not only
possible but costless. The framework is unsuited to the analysis of
unemployment at the beginning of a career and is also inadequate for the
identification of that part of a UI scheme justified by capital market
imperfection.
The object of tils paper is to examine the importance of capital
market assumptions. A special continuous—time model is developed in
sections II —IVwhich is applicable to the perfect capital market case.
It can also be used when there is no capital market at all (section IV).
For 'reasonable' parameter values the optimal replacement rate (ratio
of benefits to gross wage) appears to be less than 20% when capital
markets reperfect but over 70% when they are non existent (i.e. no
saving or dis—saving).
These models follow Baily in ignoring leisure; however, in the
perfect capital market case this produces some rather surprising results, e.g.
theunemployed spend almost as much money on searching as they would
earn if employed (and sometimes more). This result might be more
plausible iftheopportunity cost of an unemployed man's timewere
includedin the costs of search, i.e. if leisure is valued. Sections
VI and VII present results for a similar model with leisure (which has
to enter in a rather special way). The result is that in the perfect
capital market case the optimal replacement ratio falls to less than 5%,
while when there is no capital market it falls from 75% when leisure
haszero value, to 45% when it is valued at one quarter of the wage,
25% at half the wage and 0% at three quarters of the wage.—3--
II
Just as portfolio theory with its multiplicative random rates of
return is facilitated by the assumption of an iso—elastic or constant
relative risk aversion utility function, so the analysis of a random
additive labour income stream is simplest if there is constant aclnte
risk aversion. We therefore assume
U(C) =— cte8C >o (1)
As an example of the stochastic dynamic programming techniques to
be used subsequently we examine the following problem: given
(i) initial wealth W;
(ii) the utility function (1);
(iii) a constant interest rate r;
(iv) labour income y generated by a stationary Wiener process
so that (undiscounted) income over any interval h has mean
andvarianceproportional to h;
(v) additive separability over an infinite horizon with pure time
preference at the rate p.
What is the optimal consumption strategy?
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(W)= e C (W) —cte C" (W)} (6)
(7)—5—
isa solution to our problem (although we have not proved its unique-
ness).
Equation (8) implies that negative financial wealth, which has not
been ruled out, might involve negative consumption. This reflects the
fact that the utility function (1) does not have the property that
U' ++ as C --0(U' (0) =a;U' goes to plus infinity only as C
goes to minus infinity). To impose a non—negativity constraint on C
without changing U(C), C >0,would be both arbitrary and mathematically
difficult but the present tractable model is certainly deficient in this
respect.
Despite this deficiency equation (8) does enable us to identify a
number of distinct potential effects of UI on welfare through its effects
on the distribution or level of consumption.
(a) For a given distribution of wealth UI, if it raises unemploy-
ment, tends to lower mean labour income (m) but the effect of
this on consumption may be offset by a reduction in the variance
(v) of net income.
(b) In the longer run the distribution of wealth itself depends
on m and v; a reduction in the latter will reduce the inequality
of wealth and consumption. Moreover by reducing savings a smaller
v reduces mean wealth and mean consumption unless offset by
macro—policy.
(c) In a general equilibrium context, and in the absence of off-
setting macro—policy, UI induced changes in accumulation and labour
supplywillleadto changes in interest rates and wages similar to
theeffectsof other aspects of social security (see Flemming
(197k)).If the budget is used to insulate capital accumulation
from these ef2ects UI 1ich raises unemployment must also lower mean
Consumption.(d) As r +0the dependence of consumption on wealth and on
the variance of labour income both decline. This suggests, as we
shall see in subsequent calculations, that the level of optimal
UI will be an increasing function of the real intet rate
tending to zero with the interest rate. However, UI does not, in
the absence of offsetting macro—policy, increase monotonically
with r. The effect of UI on savings, and thus wealth, has an
effect on consumption proportionate to r.
It'
The model of equations (1)—(8) cannot be used as it stands since
it cannot easily admit of search activity undertaken by the unemployed.
In the absence of search it is hard to obtain a disincentive effect of
UI (indeed if one simply pcstulates that unemployment rises with UI
replacement rates the optimum may be a tax on unemployment). Both
search and compensation for the unemployed require that there be an
identifiable unemployment state.
Consider therefore the following model, in which we follow Baily
in ignoring labour/leisure choice; at any one time part of the popula-
tion is employed and earns a gross wage of 1, part is unemployed and
earns nothing. UI changes these numbers to (1 —t)and d (for
'dole'). Balance of the UI fund implies
t(1 —u)du (9)
where u is the unemployment rate.
A proportion X of those employed lose their job per unit time
while a proportion C of the unemployed find jobs. We assume here
that A is given by technological change etc. and is independent of—7-.
UI.C depends on search strategy which is influenced by UI. Note
that in the absence of population growth the steady state value of u
is A/(X +c)so that (9) becomes
=Xd/c. (10)
We initially retain the infinite horizon assumption of the previous
section in which case there are two indirect utility functions, of wealth,
one for each employment state, and two consumption functions. Using
subscripts e and u for the states the following equation, comparable








wheres is the amount ofresources expended in search.









Initially we would expect Ce(W) >C(W) withless than perfect
insurance and positive interest, thusweexpect '> andthe LHS
of (12) positive while4"isalways negative. (12) therefore implies,




Asone would expect, the employed save while the unemployed dissave.
Differentiating.(11) w.r.t. s gives
C=/e
(14)
Arguments similar to those used above show that a solution to the
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-y(X ++ + e"= log((c +8e)1
(21)
$(tS+ + c+ry)/(e + ry)) —log((e +
If r =0(=p)equation (21) implies
(22)
u)tSJ— 10—
Returning to (14) it can nowberewritten, using (17), as
—(&(y —y )) = r[1e e u = (23)
If we assun that there is no externality to search we might consider
the following model of the determination of c.




where n. is the number of contacts per period and p, their success
rate, is given by
p-ì (25)





n1, the number of contacts per period, is a function of the intensity
of search, for simplicity we assume
=gs
(28)
where r <Iindicates diminishing returns (rising travel costs?).
The individual takes average n(= gs) as given and thus chooses
to maximize •(W1) subject to— 11—
S.Ti
=c(-) (29)




Since in equilibrium s. =s
Cs=r1. (31)




where p, the success rate, is assumed to be exogenously fixed by the
behaviour of employers.3
Equations (32) imply that search, and the duration of spells of
unemployment, are both independent of wealth. This independence
enormously simplifies the dynamics of wealth.
Some idea of the structure of the model can be obtained if we
consider the case of p =r=0.As was suggested in relation to
equation (8), and is confirmed below, the optimal dole is zero if
r =0.In this case,
from (19) =I+ 8














In the next section we taken =0.5as the central case, in which case
Cgp.We shall also take A0.2as a central case (i.e. a mean
duration of employment spells of five years).Thus if the unemployment
rate were 2% in the absence of UI it would implygp =9.8.We
therefore take gp =10as a central case so that e10 (mean
duration of a spell of unemployment 5.2weeks). More precisely, assum-
ing r =p=d=0,gp =10,n= 0.5,A =0.2implies =9.8,
=— 1.92,'e =0.04,s0.96, u =0.02.Thus the unemployed
dissave 1.92 times theirwage, spending half of this on search and
consuming the other half; as mentioned in the introduction, thispossibly
implausible result is modified in the model of sectionsVI. and VII
which includes leisure.
At 0.96 the consumption of the unemployed is identicalto that of
the employed. This reflects the fact that inthe absence of discounting
and with an infinite horizon the unemployed havethe same human capital
as the employed while financial assets/liabilitiesare irrelevant. It— 13—
isthe equality between the two groups which makes UI redundant in tiis
case.
Iv
Social Welfare (S), our maximand, depends on the level and
distribution of consumption. Suumiing the individual instantaneous
utilities (1) gives
s =— of exp(—. C(W)).f(W)dW
=cz((1—u)fexp (— Ce(W))fe(W)dW —ufexp (—(a(W)).f(W)dW]
If the distributions f(W), f(W) were both normal, Ce(W) and
C(W) would also be normal so that individual utilities would be log—
normally distributed and the aggregate welfare could be written as
S = {cexp e +2r2V/2)+Ae + 2r2V/2)}(35)
where V and V are the variances of f CV) and f (W) while C
e u e u e
and C, the mean consumption levels of the employed and unemployed
respectively are, from (15):
C1=(W)+Y.—y. ie,u
It is thus necessary to establish the distributions fe(W)and
In the limit, as time goes to infinity, the distributions have
infinite meansandvariances since both are proportional to time.
Indeed eventually the tw distributions become indistinguishable with14
V(W(T))2T(y —)2Xc/Qt + E) •,
and (36)
E(W(T))W(O) +T(cy+Xy)/(A+c)
course individuals donot have infinite lives. If we consider
finite lives the- consumption optimization conditions change in three
ways: where we have rW- alone we will find W •a(r,t) —theannuity
value of W at r for the Tyearsto the horizon; the savings rates
andythough still independent of W vary with T,asalso does
optimal search s —search,like saving, being less worthwhile the
nearer the agent is to his horizon. These features of the finite horizon
case make the dynamics of wealth very much more difficult to handle than in
the infinite case.
For tractability, therefore, we are restricted to the latter for
which we evaluate below the instantaneous social welfare of a population
of immortals at an arbitrary date T after they set out on the process
with equal wealth W(O) and the equilibrium distribution of unemployment
(which depends on the U[ regime). If T is large enough we can





X exp(- (d -(1-
Equation(21) gives ;asa function of the parameters 8,r
and Aand the endogenous variables and c. From (19) 6 depends
on the parameters A and d and the endogenous variables s and c. From
(32)s— (wherer is a parameter) and c =gps1whereg— 15—
andp are parameters. Thus suitable substitution enables us to solve
(21), (32) and (19) for ,6(and s); (21) can then be solved
for 'e and then, given T and we can evaluate (37) for S(T).
The optimal value of d was found by searching over a 1% grid; in
addition to the values of y., C,s,u, and t the variance of
wealth factor V e —y)2Xc/(A +c)3was calculated and also the
contribution (x) of accumulated risk induced savings (remember r =p
throughout), xTr(CYe +Xy)/(X+c) andalso the ratio of the
consumption of the employed to that of the unemployed (at W =0)
z (d —(y+s))/(1— —
Asdescribed above we took A =0.2, =0.5and gp =10as the
standard values of those parameters. Since most people work for about
40 years we took T =20for the standard case although with a mean
duration of five years for employment spell it is rather short for our
asymptotic approximation of the wealth distribution. The standard value
of r( p) was taken as 10% per annum; as a net real rate this is on
the high side but it should be biased upwards to make some allowance for
finite lives. Given our wage unit consumption is near to unity so that
8 measures both absolute and relative risk aversion; we take 8 = 2
as standard.
Most parameters were also tried at half and twice the standard
value; with three alternative values of each of six parameters we would
have 729 (= 36) combinations. This number reduces to 13 if only one
parameter at a time is allowed to deviate from its standard value.
In the standard case average ring in response to earnings
uncertainty is, in the absence of UI, 0.15% of the gross wage, accumulated
for 20 years this adds 3.0% of the wage to mean wealth (remember that the
accruing interest is all consumed) and thus at the 10% standard interest
rate, adds 0.3% of the wage to meanconsumption.In this case the error16
introduced by our partial analysis is trivial. However when r =50%
this factor adds a non—trivial 8% of the wage to mean consumption in
the absence of UI which falls to 5% when d30%. For this reason x
is included in the table below, it represents the addition to mean
consumption japardized by UI. x(d*) is also reported; if
x(O) —x(d*)>0.2%of the wage the savings effect is likely to have a
significant impact on the estimate of the optimal level of UI. In these
cases we also evaluate the optimal UI when its effect on private savings
is suppressed.
The results of these calculations are set out in table 1 below.
Section (1) of the table sets out the different combinations of parameters
in rows 1—13 (rows 14 and 15 repeat rows 4 and 5 but the optimization
(in section (iii)) is with the savings effect suppressed). Section (ii)
gives the values of c, s, u, z, x, V etc. in the absence of UI C
whilesection (iii) gives the optimal values of d etc. for these
parameters while the impact of optimal UI on search, unemployment and
thevariance of wealth is set out in section (iv).
Row3of the table is the standard case. In the absence of UI
is 9.7 so that u= A= = 2%.e =9.7implies a mean dura-
tion of spells of unemploymentof5.4 weeks while the unemployed spend
94% of the gross wage on search and consume the same amount.Thehigh
searchexpendituresare more sensitive to r than to gp (see rows
10, 11, 13). In the standard case the optimal 'dole' is 9% of the
grosswage, this raises unemployment by 5%to 2.1% and can be financed
by a 0.2% tax on the employed. The 'dole' raises the consumption of the
unemployedfrom 94% to 95% of the wage and reduces the variance of
wealth by 7%.This reflects the fall of 'e —'ufrom 192% to 178%
of the wage,half of the reduction coming from a cut in search expendi


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparisonof rows 14 and 15 with 4 and 5 reemphasizes the
importance of the savings effect when r is high. Suppressing this
effect doubles the optimal tdole' at r =20%.Rows 3, 8 and 9 show
that changing A changes only the unemployment rates (proportionately).
V


















and (by (31)) (41)
C'flE/s— 20
From(40)






= (e1t)-e8))(+ A +
whence(from (41))
c' =(p +A+c)(1-e)1=nc/s. (43)
whence, as in (19)
6= (1—t)— (d—s) =1 +s—d(A+)/e
Social welfare in this model is






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In practice leisure rather than wealth is what is used up in search
as mentioned in the introduction. It is important for the tractability
of the model that the intensity of search be independent of wealth;
since consumption depends on wealth this means that we need a utility
function with constant relative risk aversion in consumption and the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure independent
of the level of consumption.
The function must be
U(C,h) =— -(C+O(1h)) (46)
where the consumer is endowed with one unitofuseful time(perperiod)
and h is the proportion of it devoted to work (9..)or search (s).
With a wage rate of unity labour income is £ so that it follows from
(46) that9.,* =0,1,as e i.
We assume 0 <Iso that given the opportunity people work full
time. Search, unlike work, is subject to diminishing returns so that
(or search)
s* will be interior. With a dole for the wholly unemployed, work/is
only worthwhile ifI —t> 0 +dfor which d <1—0is necessary
but not sufficient.





whereby differentiation w.r.t. C, W and s, and setting p r— 23—
U. 4!ie,u 1C 1.
— — "(rW+ (1 —t)
—
Ce(W)) (48)
—4' = P"(rW+ d —C(W))
—au(c (W),(1—s))/s=Cs(
—
which correspond to equations (11), (12) and (14).
We now define y d and note that U
=—
andfind that although the exponents in equation (17) now involve the
term —0(1—s)equations (18), (20), (21) and (22) are unchanged












whence, using the modified version of (17)
—cO/ (51)Equations (24)—(3J) describing the search process are unchanged
though s is now interpreted as a time input.(51) and (31) imply
s =mm(-Tfl'/O,1)
If s were equal toI d should be raised, as it raises the consump
tion of the unemployed without increasing their number, until either s
falls from unity or the constraint
d 1— tI —dA/c= I —dX/gp
i.e.
d < gp/A + gp
is met. However at this point ;wouldbe zero. Theref for 0 > 0
=— nYu'0 (52)
at the optimum.5
In equation (35) C. is now given by
e+(1t'Ye )
(53)
=rW+ d + 0(1 —s)J
With the three changes (50) for (19), (52) for (32) and (53) in (35),
the previous computations can be repeated with suitably amended parameter
values.
Consider again r =p=d=0;using (50) and (52)
=1—0+0s=1—O—y (54)






_10 £fl 57 8-
8A +(1-r)
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Ifrj =1/2,its central value in section IV above, y 2(1 —0)
while s
0If s1/2 were reasonable in the absence of UI it
would imply 02/3. We therefore consider 0 =0.6,0.75, 0.90
(s2/3, 1/3, 1/9). Since £= gpscentral valuesof r =1/2,
s 1/3, —10requires gp =10v'17 so we consider gp =10,17,
25.
The results of these calculations are set out in table 3. The
highest replacement rate is 4% in row 11 cn= .8). The reason for the
even lower replacement rates in this case seems to be that with —
lessthan unity in all the cases considered, the variance of wealth is
much smallerthan in the previous model (indeedfor p =r=d=0it
fallsfrom.72 to .05); moreover with more of the utility of the
unemployed coming from 'leisure' and less from dissavin interest rate
effects are also weaker. However we know that, apart from savings effects
on mean wealth, as 0 40s -1so that d* must tend towards
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gp=17and A =.02.The course of convergence towards this limit is
set out in rows 14 —20of table 3.
VII







Ifanyone works we must haEI—t> 0
=U(C,0) +-













C' —A= fl/ (61) 'e 'u
But28 —
- (e1t)- + A+c)
whence
= + = rc/s (62)
whichis the sane as (43) except that now
=(1—t)—(d+0(1 —.s)) I —0(1—s)—d(A+c)Ic
Socialwelfare is now
S = + Ee1t(X + (63)
Table4presents the results.
Conclusions
Withinthe family of rather special models considered here it seems
that current levels of replacement (50—80% in the U.S. and Western
Europe) could only be rationalised by invoking extreme capital market
imperfections. This naturally raises the question of modifying the
beefit structue tc introduce a loan element. As with student loans it
would probably be necessary to relate repayments to subsequent earnings.
As this would have further disincentive effects some combination of
loans and grants is probably called for.
Although modelling intermediate cases of capital market imperfec-
tion would be difficult, variation of the benefit formula to include
lumpsum paymentson job loss and subsidies on search would be fairly
simple. Less easy, but also feasible, would be the introduction of a

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The models presented here relate to a population homogeneous both
with respect to the wage and parameters (A) of job—loss and (gp and
Ti) representing the productivity of job search. Cripps and Tarling
(1974) have suggested that the distribution of the length of completed
spells of unemployment implies that C is not constant in the popula-
tion. In our model c would vary with the UI replacement rates but it
is plausible that gp and r also depend on the characteristics of the
individual and the market for his particular skills. Creedy and Disney
(1977) have inferred from the distribution of the frequency of spells of
unemployment that A is also distributed in the population.
If the population were divided into identifiable groups each
characterized by its own w, A, T, and gp, then in principle, we could
identify the tax and dole appropriate to that group. However our know-
ledge is more likely to be represented by a joint distribution of these
parameters and prescribing for that case is considerably more difficult.
One possible feature of it is that we would expect the parameters
applicable to the unemployed to vary with the duration of their unemploy-
ment, introducing yet another reason for relating UI benefits to duration.— 31—
Footnotes
1.To avoid temporary lay—off unemployment the pay—roll tax is payable
by fully experience—rated employers (see Feldstein (1976)).
2.We assume here that population and participation are constant. If
the active population grows at the rate Vandall new entrants join
the unemployed
=(A+v)(1—u)—
Thusin steady stawhere i0
A +v
u=A+V+e
so that A can be reinterpreted as the sum of the rates of job—loss
and population growth.
3.This behaviour probably involves varying th.i real wage rate (which
we have assumed constant) as the equilibrium unemployment rate changes
with which is a function of the policy variable d.
4.Note that this implies s <fl/s.
5.This argument ignores saving effects. Raising d reduces
aggregate savings even if search and unemployment are unaffected.
For this reason the results of table 3 show several optima characterized
by full time search.32
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(June).A NOTE ON EFFICIENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE UNDER
PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXATION
Recent theories of unemployment such as those in Phelps et.al. (1969)
emphasize the search activity of the unemployed. Expenditure of time or
money in search is of the nature of investment. As with other investments
one can ask whether the tax system is neutral with respect to the returns
to search.
Time spent searching rather than working for current income reduces
taxable income and tax paid, to this extent the Revenue subsidis search.
On the other hand, if search leads to the finding of a better paid job
the Revenue takes a share of the gain. If the tax is progressive the
Revenue's share in the gain will exceed its share in the costs thus
discouraging search. At the same time the explicit taxation of the
interest returns on other investments reduces the opportunity cost of
capital used up in search and thus encourages search.
In this note we formalise these statements and use them as the basis
for the specification or a system of unemployment benefits designed to
make the fiscal treatment of search neutral. We consider three separate
cases:
(a) progressive taxation of earned income only (no interest income
tax) on a continuous basis —thetax liability accrues as a
progressive function of the instantaneous rate of earnings;
(b) a similar tax on the sum of earned income over a period such
as a year;
(c) the continuous case (a) with income, including interest, as
the tax base.
In each case we consider an unemployed person who has the opportunity
to earn at the rate W, this represents the opportunity cost of continued
search. The person believes that search for an irirvl of time St would—2—
lead to an employment offer at the earnings level W +(SW.Both the
present opportunity and the enhanced offer are expected (correctly) to
provide employment at the respective wages for a period of T years
after which the employee's prospects are independent of the preceding
wage.
(a) On these assumptions the gain from further search is
V(r,T)[N(W +(SW)—N(W)]
where V(r,T) is the present value of .1 p.a. for T years at the tax
free interest rate r and N(.) is the net of tax wage. The cost of
obtaining this gain is assumed to be only the net income foregone; this
is the net wage N(W) arising from the available offer, less the net
benefit N(B) for which he is eligible.
Thus the private return on searching for the extra period (St is I)
V(r,T) .(N(W+(SW)—N(W))/(St(N(W)—N(B)) (1)
while in the absence of any other distortion (i.e. wages equal marginal
social product, r is the marginal social product of capital) the
social return is
V(r,T)(SW/6t .W (2)






N(W) can he writtenasW(1 —a(W))where a(W) is the average tax





(4) is easily applied to a system, like that in the U.K., where
there is a personal allowance (P) of exempt income above ich a wide
band of income is taxed at a constant 'basic' marginal rate b. For




Since b <I,bP <Pand the benefit will not be taxed. Thus the
optimal gross benefit B* =bP;B.*/W has a maximum value of b (about
1/3) at W =Pand declines steadily thereafter.
If the tax schedule were linear throughout, i.e. incorporated a
negative income tax, and was not progressive in the marginal rate,
N(O) =bPand no specific unemployment benefit is called for. Thus
this analysis calls for positive unemployment compensation on efficiency
grounds alone under any income tax progressive in the marginal rate.
However, the income tax which gives rise to this case presumably
reflects a concern for redistribution which would probably raise the
Baily (1977) and Flemming (1977).)
optimal benefit ratio above the level required for efficiency. (See /
(b)The analysis of this case is simplified if we ignore spells of
unemploymentwhichstretch over two financial years. We consider a man
who, having lost his job at the beginning of the year, finds himself in
the position described above after a fraction u of the year has passed.
If u =0no compensation is called for as the marginal tax ratein the current year, which represents the Revenue's share in thecost of
search, is the same as the marinal rate in future fully employedyears
which is the Reverue's share in the fruits of search. Ifu =IC
and benefits at the rates B(t)(0 <t<1)are taxable (3) becomes
(ignoring discounting within the year)
I—C















whereB(I) is the rate of benefit at the end of the year and lB the




7 W N'(O) I —m(O)
(
Thusover the course of a year's unemployment the tax—free benefit rate
should rise from zero to m(W) if m(O) =0.
The result, that benefits should increase with the duration of
unemployment, is contrary to the analysis of Shavell andWeiss(1977)
which points out that falling benefits provide for current consumption
while lending urgency to search by not underwriting future consumption.
The result of the present argument would be reinforced byany tendency
of W to rise during unemployment as a result of search turningup
opportunities superior to the previous ones but still below the—5—
reservation wage.
(c) If r is the pre—tax interest rate V(r,T) in (I) becomes
V(r(I —m),T)while if s is the social rate of return V(r,T) in (2)






(9) r(I —in) —eT
(Notice that since income (Y =W+rK)is now the tax base we cannot
write a and inasdepending simply on W.)
Since r(i —m)could be either greater or less than s, given
capital market imperfections, a could be either greater Or less than
unity.
Some light can be thrown on the implications of (8) by considering
the following special cases.
(i) r(I —m)=s,a =I.The gross interest rate r exceeds s
by the aunt of the marginal income tax.
Inthis case the previous result (at (a) above) is unchanged.
This case is special but not entirely absurd. The corporation
tax with 100%investment relief (expensing) and interest deduct—
ilility mayraise r to s/(I —c)where c is the corporation
tax rate (see Flemming (1976)), thus the case occurs when c =in.
(ii)T ,a=s/r(1—in), N(B)/W=I—a—s/r.
If also s =rN(B)/W =— a,in this case the interest tax
overstimulatessearch in proportion to (1 —rn)1while
progressivity inhibits it only in proportion to (m —a)so that—6—
a negative rep1acenat rate of a is required for 'neutrality'.
(iii) As T +0cx +Iand the results of section (a) go through
for all r and s.
If T =5years and r =s=10%while m =50Z
a =1.12andN(B) .44 —a (10)
This suggests that for realistic parameter values interest income
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